Word, śabda (शब्द)

Summary

Word, or testimony, is a means in more than one list, and the lists do not trust the same speaker. Nyāya (न्याय) counts the speech of a trustworthy person, and the Veda is such speech. Sāṅkhya (साङ्ख्य) counts a trusted person's speech beside perception and inference. Mīmāṃsā (मीमांसा)'s word is the Veda as command, authorless on that reading. The Buddhist books do not put the Veda on the list. The page keeps the speaker each school actually trusts.

नेपालीमा

शब्द वा आगम एकभन्दा बढी सूचीमा साधन हो, र सूचीहरूले एउटै वक्तालाई विश्वास गर्दैनन्। न्यायले आप्तको वचन गन्छ, र वेद त्यस्तो वचन हो। सांख्यले प्रत्यक्ष र अनुमानको छेउमा आप्तवचन गन्छ। मीमांसाको शब्द आज्ञाका रूपमा रहेको वेद हो, जुन त्यस पढाइमा अकर्ता हो। बौद्ध पुस्तकले वेदलाई सूचीमा राख्दैनन्। पृष्ठले हरेक दर्शनले साँच्चै विश्वास गर्ने वक्ता राख्छ।

Word, as a means, is knowing from a statement. The schools divide on whose statement, and on whether the statement is its own means or a mark in disguise.

न्याय Nyāya

Nyāya (न्याय) 1.1.7 says word is āptopadeśa (आप्तोपदेश), the teaching of a reliable person. An āpta (आप्त) is someone who has reached the thing and speaks of it as it is. 1.1.8 divides that word in two, because its object may be seen or unseen. dṛṣṭa (दृष्ट) is what can also meet the senses. adṛṣṭa (अदृष्ट) is what cannot: the unseen fruit of a rite, and what the Veda (वेद) says of that kind.

Nyāya (न्याय) 2.2.2 puts aitihya (ऐतिह्य), 'they say,' inside word. A report with no reliable person named is not a further means. It is word, or it fails as a means. That argument is on the page What Nyāya (न्याय) will not count apart.

Sāṅkhya (साङ्ख्य) and Yoga (योग)

Kārikā (कारिका) 4 calls the third means āptavacana (आप्तवचन), a trusted person's speech. Kārikā (कारिका) 5 defines it as āptaśruti (आप्तश्रुति), trusted hearing. Yoga (योग) 1.7 calls the third means āgama (आगम), what has come down.

Mīmāṃsā (मीमांसा) and Vedānta (वेदान्त)

The word that is a means, for Mīmāṃsā (मीमांसा), is the Veda (वेद), and the connection of word and meaning is not made by a person. Jaimini (जैमिनि) 1.1.5 is that claim, on Bādarāyaṇa (बादरायण)'s view as the line records it. Nyāya (न्याय)'s āpta (आप्त) is a person. Mīmāṃsā (मीमांसा)'s Veda (वेद) has no author. Hold both.

The same sūtra (सूत्र) contains anupalabdhe (अनुपलब्धे), 'when the object is not perceived.' That form is about an object out of sight. It is not the later name anupalabdhi (अनुपलब्धि), non-apprehension as its own means. The non-apprehension page keeps the two apart.

Vedānta (वेदान्त) 1.1.3 is one compound, śāstrayonitvāt (शास्त्रयोनित्वात्): because scripture is the source. The line is how Brahman (ब्रह्मन्), named in the two lines before it, is known.

Upadeśasāhasrī (उपदेशसाहस्री) 17.8, in Śaṅkara (शङ्कर)'s own verses, says that here, for the attainment of that knowledge, the Veda (वेद) alone is the means. 17.9 says the oneness of the self is known from grasping the meaning of the sentence. Worldly knowing, in this school, still uses the Bhāṭṭa (भाट्ट) six. A pot remains a thing the eye can know.

laukika-śabda (लौकिक-शब्द) and vaidika-śabda (वैदिक-शब्द)

The later books cut word by the speaker. laukika-śabda (लौकिक-शब्द) is a secular statement, the speech of a trustworthy human person: there is water in this well, a road runs to that town. vaidika-śabda (वैदिक-शब्द) is Vedic speech. Nyāya (न्याय) 1.1.8 cuts the other way, by the object: dṛṣṭa (दृष्ट), what the senses can also meet, and adṛṣṭa (अदृष्ट), what they cannot. A human sentence can be about either object. The Veda (वेद), for these schools, speaks of what the senses cannot settle. The two cuts are two questions.

On Nyāya (न्याय) 1.1.7 both kinds are āptopadeśa (आप्तोपदेश), the teaching of a reliable person. A human āpta (आप्त) carries the secular statement. The Veda (वेद) is authoritative, on this school's reading, because its speaker is Īśvara (ईश्वर), reliable and free of error. The sūtra (सूत्र) says āptopadeśa (आप्तोपदेश). The step from that word to 'God composed the Veda (वेद)' is the school's reading. The line itself does not recite it.

Mīmāṃsā (मीमांसा) refuses that step, whether the proposed author is a man or Īśvara (ईश्वर). Jaimini (जैमिनि) 1.1.5 says the connection of word and meaning is autpattika (औत्पत्तिक), innate. 1.1.18 says the word is nitya (नित्य), eternal. 1.1.27 is the objection that branch names such as Kāṭhaka (काठक) are the names of makers. 1.1.29 answers that the word's priority has already been stated: a reciter is not an author. An author, even a divine one, would leave the injunction depending on a person. vaidika-śabda (वैदिक-शब्द) is apauruṣeya (अपौरुषेय), authorless. laukika-śabda (लौकिक-शब्द) can be an āpta (आप्त)'s speech, and it is still not the means by which dharma (धर्म) is known.

Vaiśeṣika (वैशेषिक) and Jaina (जैन)

Vaiśeṣika (वैशेषिक) 9.2.3 says verbal knowing is explained by the account of the mark. The sūtra (सूत्र) places śābda (शाब्द) under laiṅgika (लैङ्गिक). Later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (न्याय-वैशेषिक) gives word its own place. Read the sūtra (सूत्र) as the sūtra (सूत्र).

Jaina (जैन) śruta (श्रुत) is scripture and what is heard, and Tattvārtha (तत्त्वार्थ) 1.11 groups it with mati (मति) as parokṣa (परोक्ष). The Jain page is that cut. Cārvāka (चार्वाक) reports refuse the Veda (वेद) as a means. The Buddhist pramāṇa (प्रमाण) school treats a statement as a sign, so word falls under inference. Those verses are not in this book.