The pramāṇas / Inference

Inference, anumāna (अनुमान)

Summary

Inference is a knowing that moves by a sign. Nyāya (न्याय) builds it as a five membered proof. Sāṅkhya (साङ्ख्य) says it is threefold and depends on a mark and what has the mark. The Buddhist books examine the sign until a nature of its own drops out. Cārvāka (चार्वाक), in the reports, allows a cause you have seen at work and refuses a jump to a self or a fruit after death. The page says who counts inference, and which line is the definition.

नेपालीमा

अनुमान चिह्नबाट चल्ने ज्ञान हो। न्यायले यसलाई पाँच अवयवको प्रमाण बनाउँछ। सांख्यले तीन प्रकारको हो र लिङ्ग तथा लिङ्गीमा अड्छ भन्छ। बौद्ध पुस्तकले आफ्नै स्वभाव झर्दासम्म चिह्नलाई जाँच्छन्। रिपोर्टहरूमा चार्वाकले आफूले काम गरेको देखेको कारण मान्छ, तर आत्मा वा मृत्युपछिको फलतिर उफ्रन दिँदैन। पृष्ठले कसले अनुमान गन्छ र परिभाषा कुन पङ्क्ति हो भन्छ।

anu (अनु) is after. māna (मान) is a measuring. Inference measures from something already grasped. A mark is seen. What has the mark is then known.

न्याय Nyāya

Nyāya (न्याय) 1.1.5 says inference comes after perception, and that it is of three kinds: pūrvavat (पूर्ववत्), śeṣavat (शेषवत्), and sāmānyatodṛṣṭa (सामान्यतोदृष्ट). The line names them and does not draw the pictures. The sitting on that line gives the three pictures the later books argue from: the later effect from a cause already known, the remaining cause from the effect, and a general likeness where that cause and that effect have not been seen together.

A stated proof has five members, the pañcāvayava (पञ्चावयव). Nyāya (न्याय) 1.1.32 names them: pratijñā (प्रतिज्ञा), hetu (हेतु), udāharaṇa (उदाहरण), upanaya (उपनय), and nigamana (निगमन). That line is how a public debate sets an inference out. The five are limbs of one inference. They are not a further means.

The sūtras (सूत्र) define the members and do not tell the mountain story. The sitting of 1.1.33 uses 'sound is non-eternal' as a thesis. The mountain is the picture the later lessons use, so that each limb has something to say.

MemberThe line's jobThe mountain picture
pratijñā (प्रतिज्ञा), the proposition. 1.1.33sādhyanirdeśa (साध्यनिर्देश), the stating of what is to be established.The mountain possesses fire. parvato (पर्वतो) vahnimān (वह्निमान्).
hetu (हेतु), the ground. 1.1.34The establishing of what is to be proved, by likeness to the example. 1.1.35 adds the route by unlikeness.Because of smoke. dhūmāt (धूमात्).
udāharaṇa (उदाहरण), the example. 1.1.36A familiar case that bears the property. 1.1.37 is the contrary case.Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in a kitchen. yatra (यत्र) yatra (यत्र) dhūmaḥ (धूमः) tatra (तत्र) tatra (तत्र) vahniḥ (वह्निः) yathā (यथा) mahānase (महानसे). Before tatra (तत्र) the visarga of dhūmaḥ (धूमः) is heard as s.
upanaya (उपनय), the application. 1.1.38The summing up, depending on the example, that the subject is so, or is not so.And this mountain is likewise smoky. tathā (तथा) cāyaṃ (चायं) parvato (पर्वतो) dhūmavān (धूमवान्).
nigamana (निगमन), the conclusion. 1.1.39The thesis said again, once the reason has been stated.Therefore this mountain is fiery. tasmāt (तस्मात्) parvato (पर्वतो) vahnimān (वह्निमान्).

Two names from the later manuals sit on this five, and 1.1.32 does not recite them. vyāpti (व्याप्ति) is invariable concomitance: wherever the reason is found, the property to be proved is found. The example is the member that states it. In the picture, wherever there is smoke there is fire. pakṣadharmatā (पक्षधर्मता) is the reason's presence in the subject. The later name pakṣa (पक्ष) is that subject, here the mountain. The sūtra (सूत्र)'s own word in 1.1.38 is sādhya (साध्य), and the sitting of 1.1.33 keeps the wider use: what is to be established, the subject together with the property claimed of it. Smoke belongs to this mountain. The application is the member that says so.

साङ्ख्य Sāṅkhya

Kārikā (कारिका) 5 says inference is threefold, and that it is preceded by the sign and by what has the sign. liṅga (लिङ्ग) is the mark you see. liṅgin (लिङ्गिन्) is the bearer. Smoke is the sign. Fire is the bearer. The new knowing is of the bearer.

वैशेषिक Vaiśeṣika

Vaiśeṣika (वैशेषिक) 9.2.1 lists five ways a mark can sit: effect, cause, conjunct, opposite, and inherent. The line calls that whole laiṅgika (लैङ्गिक). 9.2.4 then lines up reason, the stating of the reason, the mark, the means, and the instrument, and says they are not different things. One job, several names.

What gets folded into inference

Nyāya (न्याय) 2.2.2 places postulation, inclusion, and absence inside inference. The page What Nyāya (न्याय) will not count apart reads that line beside the objection. Sāṅkhya (साङ्ख्य) has a shorter version of the same decision at kārikā (कारिका) 4: every means gets its standing from the three.

The Buddhist pramāṇa (प्रमाण) school counts inference as the second of two means, the one for what is hidden. Those verses are not in the Madhyamaka (मध्यमक) or Yogācāra (योगाचार) books linked from the index.